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Abstrat We propose a mehanism for providing the inentives for reporting truthful
feedbak in a peer-to-peer system for exhanging servies (or ontent). This mehanism
is to omplement reputation mehanisms that employ ratings' feedbak on the vari-
ous transations in order to provide inentives to peers for oering better servies to
others. Under our approah, eah of the transating peers (rather than just the lient)
submits a rating on the performane of their mutual transation. If these are in dis-
agreement, then both transating peers are punished, sine suh an oasion is a sign
that one of them is lying. The severity of eah peer's punishment is determined by his
orresponding non-redibility metri; this is maintained by the mehanism and evolves
aording to the peer's reord. When under punishment, a peer does not transat with
others. We model the punishment eet of the mehanism in a peer-to-peer system as
a Markov hain that is experimentally proved to be very aurate. Aording to this
model, the redibility mehanism leads the peer-to-peer system to a desirable steady
state isolating liars. Then, we dene a proedure for the optimization of the punish-
ment parameters of the mehanism for peer-to-peer systems of various harateristis.
We experimentally prove that this optimization proedure is eetive and neessary for
the suessful employment of the mehanism in real peer-to-peer systems. Then, the
optimized redibility mehanism is ombined with reputation-based poliies to provide
a omplete solution for high performane and truthful rating in peer-to-peer systems.
The ombined mehanism was experimentally proved to deal very eetively with large
frations of ollaborated liar peers that follow stati or dynami rational lying strate-
gies in peer-to-peer systems with dynamially renewed population, while the eÆieny
loss indued to sinere peers by the presene of liars is diminished. Finally, we desribe
the potential implementation of the mehanism in real peer-to-peer systems.
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21 Introdution
Peer-to-peer systems have beome very popular as environments for exhanging ser-
vies, i.e. les, storage apaity, video streams, et. Commerial exploitation of peer-
to-peer systems is also under way due to their unpreeded salability. For example,
ommerial peer-to-peer systems, suh as BBC iPlayer
1
and Kontiki
2
, are employed
for ontent delivery. Another example is that, in many peer-to-peer video streaming
systems suh as P2PLive
3
and Sopast
4
, the initial enoder and uploader of a free video
lip or hannel often embeds advertisements in the video stream obtaining some value
for his eort to enode and upload the original video stream. If there is no aounting
of information about who is oering what to whom in suh systems, then peers have
the opportunity for free-riding, and for providing maliious servies or servies of un-
aeptably low quality. Due to this information asymmetry among transating peers,
the risk for a peer of plaing some individual eort and reeiving muh less in return
is high. Reputation on the basis of ratings an be a proper means for ahieving a-
ountability, sine it reveals hidden information regarding the inherent quality and the
behavior (i.e. performane) of peers [1℄, [2℄. However, as we showed in [2℄, a reputation
metri should be exploited by reputation-based poliies that determine the pairs of
peers eligible to transat. When suh poliies are employed, the total value generated
within the system is shared to peers aording to their performane, thus, providing the
right inentives to peers for exerting eort and oering servies of high quality. How-
ever, reputation mehanisms are vulnerable to false or strategi rating. For example,
a partiular peer may benet by submitting unjustied positive ratings for his friends
and/or negative ratings for his ompetitors. This problem is further augmented in ase
of pseudo-spoong, i.e. use of multiple false identities, whih may appear in a peer-
to-peer system. In this paper, we deal with the issue of redibility, i.e. truthfulness of
the submitted ratings' feedbak. Many reputation systems deal with this issue together
with that of promoting high performane [3℄, [4℄, [5℄. Suh an approah provides peers
with the inentive for employing various maliious strategies; e.g. an adversary peer
may obtain a high reputation by oering servies of high performane and subsequently
exploit it as a rater to demote his ompetitors or to promote his olleagues. Moreover,
poor performane and lying are not neessarily related; e.g. poor performane may be
inherent for a peer due to his limited resoures. In the present work, we deal with
redibility separately from performane. In partiular, we propose a proper mehanism
for promoting truthful reporting of feedbak information that was rst presented in
[6,7℄. This mehanism detets and penalizes peers that lie. A non-redibility value as
well as a punishment state is maintained for eah peer. The eet of our redibility
mehanism in a peer-to-peer system is modeled as a Markov hain. We experimentally
prove that this model is very aurate. Employing this model, we prove our meha-
nism leads the peer-to-peer system with very large frations of ollaborated liar peers
to a desirable steady state, where almost all liars are almost always under punishment,
while sinere peers are almost never under punishment. Using this Markov model, we
also dene a xed-point proedure for optimization of the punishment parameters of
the redibility mehanism for peer-to-peer systems of dierent harateristis based
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3on ergodi arguments. We experimentally prove that this proedure is Pareto optimal
for sinere peers and neessary for maximizing the eetiveness of the mehanism in
peer-to-peer systems of dierent harateristis. Moreover, we show that the redibil-
ity mehanism an be ombined very eetively with reputation-based poliies that
promote high performane, thus providing a omplete and pratially implementable
solution for aountability in peer-to-peer environments. We experimentally justify
that the optimized redibility mehanism deals suessfully with very large frations of
liars in peer-to-peer systems with dynamially renewed population. Even if liar peers
follow various stati and dynami lying strategies and are ollaborated in order to
gain unfair advantage, our experiments reveal that the eÆieny attained for sinere
peers by the optimized redibility mehanism ombined with reputation-based poliies
is omparable to that of the ase where no liar peers are present in the system. The
mehanism provides peers with the right inentives for truthful reporting of feedbak
information, as sinere peers always reeive more benet from the peer-to-peer system
than liar peers, whose benet is minimal. Thus, the redibility mehanism is strate-
gyproof. Finally, we desribe how our redibility mehanism an be implemented in a
real peer-to-peer system without entral trusted authorities. We also prove with simu-
lation experiments the eetiveness of the proposed arhiteture for dealing with large
frations of liars.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Setion 2, we overview the
literature related to truthful ratings. In Setion 3, we dene the proposed redibility
mehanism. In Setion 4, we model the eet of the mehanism regarding the pun-
ishment states of the peers as a Markov hain and, in Setion 5, we introdue the
proedure for optimizing the parameters of the mehanism. In Setion 6, we overview
our approah for the assessment of the mehanism, of the Markovian model and of the
optimization proedure, while, in Setion 7, we desribe the simulation model that we
employ in the experiments of this paper. Then, in Setion 8, we prove the auray of
the Markovian model, the eetiveness of the optimized mehanism, and the appliabil-
ity and the neessity of the optimization proedure for maximizing the eetiveness of
the mehanism for any peer-to-peer system of dierent harateristis. Also, in Setion
9, we ombine the redibility mehanism with reputation-based poliies and experi-
mentally prove that the right inentives regarding both reporting and performane are
provided to peers. Furthermore, in Setion 10, we desribe the potential implementa-
tion of the redibility mehanism in a peer-to-peer system in the absene of trusted
entities and experimentally prove the eetiveness of the proposed approah. Finally,
in Setion 11, we onlude our work.
2 Related Work
Below, we overview a variety of artiles dealing either expliitly or impliitly with the
onsequenes of lying in eletroni environments, and, in ertain ases, with how to
alleviate them. We emphasize on the dierenes of these works with our assumptions
as well as with our redibility mehanism and its eetiveness, in order to larify our
ontribution.
Dellaroas [8℄ addresses the problem of unfair high or low ratings to sellers (\ballot
stuÆng" or \bad-mouthing") and positive or negative disriminatory behavior against
lients in on-line trading ommunities where ollaborated liars onstitute at most 10%
of the entire population of buyers. Only ballot stuÆng and positive disrimination are
4dealt in [8℄, by employing ollaborative ltering tehniques to weight ratings in trust
estimation proportionally to the similarity of preferenes between the estimator and
the raters. Moreover, this approah is not diretly amenable to peer-to-peer environ-
ments where onsumers are also produers of servies, and bad-mouthing and negative
disrimination an also arise due to peers' personal interest. Also, nding buyers with
ommon taste requires a global view of the transation history and raises privay issues.
An approah for improving the eetiveness of ollaborative ltering for smaller sets of
\similar" raters (i.e. neighbors) seleted for prediting ratings has been proposed in [9℄,
where rating predition errors on dierent items are found to be orrelated to the sim-
ilarity of these items and to the shared neighbors of the items. However, the approah
in [9℄ does not onsider untruthful reommendations. Chen et al. [10℄ deal with the
redibility of raters based on the quality and the quantity of the ratings they provide.
However, the method assigns high ondene to ratings that agree with a majority
opinion. Therefore, lying adversaries an still improve their redibility by submitting
a large amount of feedbak and thus forming the majority opinion.
Shillo et al. [11℄ deal separately with strategi performane and redibility using
the so-alled dislosed prisoners' dilemma game with partner seletion. Credibility and
performane (due to strategi behavior) of other agents are updated by an agent's
own observations. Testimonies of witness agents are used for partner seletion. It is
assumed in [11℄ that witnesses may hide positive feedbak but not tell lies in order
not to be disovered. The approah approximates hidden feedbak of witnesses and
alulates a transitive redibility metri over a path to an agent using Bayes' rule.
However, an adversary may still strategially gain high redibility by being truthful
in his laims about his high oered performane and then manipulate as a witness
the partner seletion of other agents. Furthermore, ollaboration among lying agents
is not onsidered in [11℄. The need for disovering witnesses for an agent is also a
drawbak of applying this approah in large eletroni ommunities where the same
agents meet very rarely. Damiani et al, in [12℄, extend Gnutella protool to alulate
performane and redibility of other peers based on a peer's own experiene and votes
from witnesses. Credibility is alulated in a similar way in [13℄, where trustworthiness
of a peer is based on ve fators, namely the feedbak it reeives on its performane
from other peers, the number of transations, the redibility of the feedbak soure, the
transation ontext fator (i.e. size and kind of transation) and the ommunity ontext
fator (e.g. ommon inentives or beliefs). [12,13℄ approahes for alulating redibility
are similar in many aspets to that of [11℄ and hene they have the same limitations.
The same idea with [11℄, yet for evaluating diret and indiret reommendations, also
taking into aount ontext similarity of raters is proposed in [14℄.
Credibility and performane (due to strategi behavior) are also addressed by Yu
and Singh [3℄. However, this approah has no expliit mehanism for assessing the
redibility of the witnesses; this issue is dealt together with a trust metri regarding
behavior, whih is determined by diret observations or by asking witnesses. Therefore,
it is possible for an adversary peer to maintain a good reputation by performing high
quality servies and send false feedbak for its ompetitors or his olleagues. A similar
approah that has the same limitations with [3℄ is followed by Malaga in [15℄, where eah
rating is weighted by a funtion of the reputation of the rater. Credibility is addressed
jointly with performane by Kamvar et al. in [5℄. Therein, a global reputation metri
regarding performane of eah peer is alulated in distributed way and eah peer's
loal beliefs (based on observations) on the performane of other peers are weighted
by the others' beliefs on his own performane. [16℄ improves the onvergene speed of
5global reputation of peers as related to [5℄. It employs a gossiping protool aording to
whih loal reputation is preferentially sent to power peers (i.e. peers that attrat most
of the requests). [16℄ takes as redibility of the raters their global reputation values.
This approah is argued to ounter dissemination of false loal reputation values by
maliious peers. However, as simulation experiments in [16℄ reveal, it has low auray
even if only 10% perentage of ollusive peers lustered in small groups are present in
the system.
Aberer et al. [4℄ present an approah to evaluate trustworthiness (i.e. the ombina-
tion of redibility and performane) of peers based on the omplaints posed for them
by other peers following transations. The approah also aims to provide inentives for
truthful submission of omplaints. The main idea is that a peer is onsidered less trust-
worthy the more omplaints he reeives or les. An agent trusts another if the latter is
at least as trustworthy as the former. The experiments onduted showed that the ap-
proah does not sueed in identifying a signiant part of liar peers if they onstitute
25% of the population. Note that the eetiveness of the approah in the ase of ol-
laborated liars was not examined and the approah is not robust against various types
of peers' misbehavior. Feldman et al. [17℄ address the problems of free-riding (i.e. poor
performane) and misreporting of feedbak on ontributions (i.e. low redibility) by an
indiret reiproity sheme. Their objetive is for eah peer to oer to any other peer
roughly equal benet as indiretly oered by the latter to the former. However, their
approah provides opportunity for peers to lie about the ontribution of other peers in
order the latter to be unfairly exploited or for another liar ollaborated with the former
to prevail in ompetition. Ngan et al. [18℄ have proposed another indiret reiproative
approah for avoiding free-riding and false laims in a peer-to-peer system for sharing
storage apaity. This approah requires peers to publish auditable reords of their
apaity and their loally and remotely stored les. However, ollaborated adversaries
an exploit this mehanism by laiming to have stored huge les of one to another. It
is important to note that, to the best of our knowledge, our redibility mehanism is
able to eetively deal with the highest frations of ollaborated liar peers that follow
various stati or dynami strategies in the literature, as explained in Setion 9.
A side payment approah for eliiting honest feedbak in eletroni markets has
been proposed by Miller et al. in [19℄. In partiular, a payment harged to a buyer is
paid to a seond buyer aording to a soring rule for his predition of the rating of a
later buyer for their ommon seller. In the environment onsidered, honest reporting
proved to be Nash equilibrium. However, strategi voting was onsidered to generate
no value for buyers, whih is not the ase in general, partiularly in ases of strate-
gi ollaborations. This approah does not deal with ollaborated liars, while it is not
appropriate for peer-to-peer systems, as it involves the employment of a entral bank
that distributes payments to peers. Jura and Faltings [20℄ have proposed a similar
approah that also has similar limitations. Another budget-balaned rewarding meha-
nism is proposed in [21℄ for providing inentives to partiipants to truthful report their
subjetive distributions on their beliefs over a hidden variable, so that it is olletively
revealed. The approah seems promising for a limited set of privately observed variables
by a large set of agents. However, it is deemed as an adequate approah for revealing
the hidden performane of peers due to the large amount of information that has to
be exhanged among all raters for eah peer and the neessary exhange of rewards.
An approah for providing inentives for truthful reporting of feedbak in e-markets
has been proposed by Jura and Faltings in [22℄. This approah, similarly to ours,
employs disagreement in feedbak messages for disovering potential lying. However,
6upon disagreement dierent xed side-payments are ned to the transating agents
with the one ned to the seller being higher. This approah is not diretly amenable to
peer-to-peer systems sine side payments require the existene of a bank for mediating
the transations, while sellers and buyers are not supposed to exhange roles. Also, in
[22℄, strategi voting and ollaborated lying agents are not onsidered.
In [23℄, Sybil attaks are enountered based on a PKI approah. Peers employ self-
reated ertiates to sign their identities, whih are split to groups and resigned by
group ertiates. Upon identity reation, the peers are assigned to groups based on
user redentials that prove that the identity orresponds to a real person. However,
lying on reommendations is still possible in [23℄. This approah ould be used om-
plementary to our redibility mehanism to deal with Sybil attaks. Finally, in perfet
pseudonymity settings, Resnik and Sami propose in [24℄ an approah for limiting the
total trust that an be exploited by Sybil attaks; the total trust is kept bounded by its
initial value after any transations. We agree with [24℄ that, in this ontext, some soial
loss due to Sybil attaks is unavoidable. Although, our redibility mehanism dimin-
ishes soial loss even for very large frations of adversary identities, as experimentally
shown in Setion 9.
3 The Credibility Mehanism
Consider a peer-to-peer system for exhanging servies that employs a distributed repu-
tation system for performane. The lient peer, after a transation, sends feedbak that
rates his oered performane. For example, he may rate the transation as \suess-
ful" (i.e. high oered performane) or as \unsuessful" (i.e. low oered performane).
Simple binary feedbak mehanisms are not only suÆient to appropriately reveal the
hidden performane and quality, but, as proved in [25℄, the most eÆient ooperation
equilibrium is the one where partiipants group arbitrary ratings into two disjoint sets:
positive and negative. We assume that votes are aggregated into reputation values us-
ing the Beta aggregation rule [26℄. That is, eah peer's reputation equals the fration
of the \weighted number" of his suessful servie provisions over the \total weighted
number" of his servie provisions, with the weight of eah servie provision being a neg-
ative exponential funtion of the elapsed time. The feedbak messages are useful only if
their ontent is true. Unfortunately, peers atually have the inentive of strategi rating
of others' performane, sine they an thus hide their poor performane, improve their
reputation, and possibly take advantage of others. Thus, a proper mehanism should
make lying ostly or at least unprotable. \Punishing liars" has already been proposed
in [27℄ and [17℄. Nevertheless, two questions arise: How an lying peers be disovered?
How an they be punished in a peer-to-peer system, where there is no entral on-
trol? Under our approah peers submit ratings' feedbak aording to the following
rules: i) after a transation, both peers involved have to send one feedbak message
eah, and ii) besides voting the transation as suessful or not, eah feedbak message
also ontains a quantiable performane metri, e.g. the number of transferred bytes
of useful ontent. We assume that the observed performane is with high probability
the same with that atually oered. (The opposite may only our due to unexpeted
events during a transation like network ongestion et.) Thus, if feedbak messages
for a transation are in disagreement (either in their performane metri or in their
vote), then, with high probability, at least one of the transated peers is lying and has
to be somehow \punished", in order for the right inentives to be provided. However,
7the system annot tell whih of the peers does lie, and onsequently whom to believe
and whom to punish. Thus, aording to our approah, both peers are punished in
this ase. This idea was initially introdued in [27℄. However, by simply applying it, a
sinere peer is often punished unfairly.
Therefore, we need a omplete mehanism speifying how to punish peers in a
system without entral ontrol and how to limit potential unfairness. To this end, we
introdue for eah peer: i) the non-redibility metri nr 2 [0;+1), whih orresponds
to reputation for non-redibility, and ii) a binary punishment state variable, delaring
whether the peer is \under punishment" (if the variable is \true") or not (if the vari-
able is \false"). For eah peer, both nr and punishment state are publi information,
i.e. they are appropriately stored so that they are available to other peers (see Setion
10 for pratial implementation details). Upon entering the peer-to-peer system, eah
peer is assigned a moderately high initial non-redibility value nr
0
, while he is not
under punishment. (Note that the lower nr the better for the peer.) This hoie of
nr
0
oers to peers limited gain from whitewashing their non-redible reord and re-
enter the system under new pseudonyms. The owhart of the redibility mehanism
is depited in Figure 1. In partiular, after a transation between two not punished
peers i, j their feedbak messages f
i
, f
j
are sent as input to the mehanism: Upon
disagreement (i.e. if f
i
6= f
j
), the non-redibility values of the transated peers are
both inreased by 1 while both peers get punished. The duration of a peer's punish-
ment equals b
nr
, i.e. is exponential in his non-redibility nr, with a base b > 1. Upon
agreement (i.e. if f
i
= f
j
), the non-redibility values of the transated peers are de-
reased (i.e. improved) by d, where 0 < d < 1, without ever allowing them to drop
below 0. The ommon feedbak is forwarded to the system omputing reputation for
performane. If the reputation mehanism employed more than two feedbak levels or
the ratings involved subjetivity, then the mathing rules for determining agreement
or disagreement should be properly adjusted. For example, feedbak agreement ould
be observed by examining if the atual distane between the two ratings was within a
ertain threshold that depends on the subjetivity level in the system and the semanti
proximity of the dierent feedbak levels. Derease of non-redibility in ases of agree-
ment serves as a rehabilitation mehanism. This is ruial for the eÆient operation
of the redibility mehanism, beause, as already mentioned, upon disagreement in re-
ports, most probably one peer is unfairly punished. The ratio 1:d determines the speed
of restoring a non-redible reporting behavior. We employ additive inrease/derease
of the non-redibility values for simpliity. Other approahes suh as multipliative
inrease/additive derease are also plausible.
Punishing peers is not an easy task to ahieve in the absene of any ontrol meh-
anism, partiularly if peers have full ontrol over their part of the peer-to-peer mid-
dleware. In our mehanism, a punishment amounts to losing the value oered by other
peers for the period of punishment. That is, a peer under punishment should not trans-
at with others during his punishment period, while, if this happens, his ratings for
suh transations are not taken into aount. The latter measure provides inentives
for peers to abide with the former one! Indeed, rst, note that sinere peers under
punishment are not expeted to be willing to oer servies as they would be subjet
to strategi voting without being able to disagree. On the other hand, liar punished
peers ollaborated with other liar peers that strategially vote them (i.e. always pos-
itively) an raise their reputation without high servie performane. Thus, they have
no inentives to perform well during their punishment. Based on the above, no peer
has any inentives to ask for servies from a punished peer exept for the purpose of
8input
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Fig. 1 The redibility mehanism.
strategi voting. Moreover, no peer has any inentive to perform well when oering
servies to a punished peer, beause the orresponding feedbak is not taken into a-
ount. To strengthen these inentives prohibiting transations with punished peers we
introdue a rule: If a peer transats with a punished one, then both of the transating
peers are punished as if they were involved in a new disagreement. Note that, if no
feedbak is submitted for suh a transation, then this transation is not traed by the
mehanism. However, in suh a ase, the transation would have taken plae for the
sole purpose of altruisti or ollusive servie exhange and it would not aet the a-
uray of reputation information of the servie performane inentives. Therefore, the
non-redibility value of a peer remains unhanged during his punishment period unless
he is disovered to transat with other peers; in suh a ase it is further inreased.
4 The Markovian Model
In this setion, we analytially study the eetiveness of the proposed mehanism in
equilibrium for providing inentives to peers for truthful reporting. For this purpose,
we dene a disrete-time Markov-hain model of a peer-to-peer system where the red-
ibility mehanism is employed. Then, we derive the steady-state distribution of the
punishment state of sinere and liar peers of the modeled peer-to-peer system. Mod-
eling of time is slightly dierent than that introdued in Setion 3 for onveniene. In
partiular, for the purpose of speifying and analyzing this Markov hain, we dene
as time step of our disrete-time model the interval between two suessive servie
requests by any peer, heneforth referred to as transation unit. We assume that in
this interval at most one transation takes plae. Thus, transition from one state to
another an only happen after a transation between any two peers. This time mod-
eling signiantly failitates the analysis of the Markov-hain model and the study of
the performane of the original system dened in Setion 3. Performane measures an
be easily translated from the new \transation units" to atual time slots; see Setion
5. Note that at the beginning of eah time step, a peer is randomly seleted to be the
lient of the only transation that takes plae in this step.
We assume that there are two types of peers, namely sinere and liar ones. Sinere
peers always report their feedbak truthfully, while liar peers always disagree in their
transations, unless they transat with other liar peers ollaborated with them. The
9total populations of sinere and liar peers in the peer-to-peer system modeled as a
Markov hain are S
0
and L
0
respetively. The population of the peer-to-peer system
an be dynamially renewed as long as S
0
and L
0
remain xed. Consider that a state
is a snapshot of the system where state variables are the number s of sinere peers
not under punishment, the number l of liar peers not under punishment, and the
number k of peers under punishment. Clearly, this Markov hain has (S
0
+ 1)(L
0
+ 1)
dierent states. Observe also that the state variable k an be omputed by the formula
k = S
0
  s+L
0
  l, but k is still used for readability reasons. Let q be the probability
that a requested servie is found at a ertain peer and r to be the probability that a
peer asks for a servie. Reall that redibility values and punishment state are publi
information, and that not punished peers are not allowed to transat with punished
peers. The probability y that a seleted lient peer nds a requested servie is given
by:
y = r(1  (1  q)
s+l 1
) (1)
A lient sinere peer is punished if he nds his servie at a liar peer. The probability
P
S
of this event is given by:
P
S
=
l
s+ l  1
y (2)
A lient liar peer is punished if he interats with a sinere peer or with another liar
peer that is not ollaborated with. Thus, the probability of punishment for a lient liar
peer is given by the formula below:
P
L
=
s
s+ l  1
y +
l  1
s+ l   1
y(1  ) (3)
 is the fration of liars that are ollaborated to eah other or alternatively the prob-
ability that two liar peers are ollaborated. In the analysis that follows, we study the
ase where all liar peers are ollaborated with eah other, whih is the hardest one for
the mehanism to deal with.
Reall that at the beginning of eah time step, a peer is randomly seleted to be
the lient of the only transation to take plae. The probability P
T
that the two peers
of a transation are punished, i.e. they disagree in their feedbak messages is given by:
P
T
= y

s
s+ l
P
S
+
l
s+ l
P
L

(4)
For modeling purposes, we assume that during a time step, a sinere (resp. liar) peer
that is under punishment an be \rehabilitated", i.e. stop being under punishment
in the next step, with probability P
RHS
(resp. P
RHL
). Thus, when there are k =
S
0
  s + L
0
  l peers under punishment in the urrent state, the average number of
rehabilitated peers in the next state is (S
0
  s)P
RHS
+(L
0
  l)P
RHL
. Next, we relate
the Markovian model with the original mehanism of Setion 3.
Suppose that the peer-to-peer system is urrently in state (s; l; k), i.e. there are s
not punished sinere and l not punished liar peers, while k peers are under punishment.
Then, in the next time step (i.e. after a transation), the system may move to various
states with the transition probabilities given in the Table 1. Term A orresponds to the
transition arising when the transating peer are punished, while term B orresponds
to the transition arising when they are not punished. Both terms also involve the
probability of rehabilitation of the number of liar and sinere peers neessary for the
transation to happen.
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Table 1 The transition probability from urrent state (s; l; k) to another.
Transition Probability
Probability[(s; l; k)! (s  1 + i; l  1 + j; k + 2  i  j) = A+B, where
A =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
P
T

S
0
  s
i

P
RHS
i
(1  P
RHS
)
S
0
 s i

L
0
  l
j

P
RHL
j

(1  P
RHL
)
L
0
 l j
, for 0  i  S
0
  s and 0  j  L
0
  l
0, otherwise
B =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
(1  P
T
)

S
0
  s
i  1

P
RHS
i 1
(1  P
RHS
)
S
0
 s i+1

L
0
  l
j   1

P
RHL
j 1

(1  P
RHL
)
L
0
 l j+1
, for 1  i  S
0
  s+ 1 and 1  j  L
0
  l+ 1
0, otherwise
Under the Markovian model, the distribution of the punishment period is geomet-
ri; i.e. the duration of the punishment period is independent of the peer's past history.
Clearly, this is only an approximation of our redibility mehanism that was desribed
in Setion 3, whih is very ompliated to model aurately and has a huge state-spae.
Indeed, reall that a peer upon disagreement is punished for a time period that is expo-
nential to his non-redibility value, whih should be maintained as part of the state for
all peers! However, as the results of Setion 6 reveal, this approximation is indiative
of the performane of the atual mehanism provided that rehabilitation probabilities
are suessfully seleted. Indeed, let us denote as  the period of onvition for a peer
with a ertain punishment reord. Then, for a geometri-distribution approximation
of this period, the probability of rehabilitation of this peer in the next state should
be estimated as 1=. The probabilities P
RHS
and P
RHL
that lead to the same ex-
peted punishment time per type of peer (throughout a peer's lifetime) depend on the
parameters b, nr
0
, and d of the redibility mehanism. All these parameters an be
inter-related by means of the optimization proedure presented in Setion 5. Thus, for
given b, nr
0
, and d, appropriate values of P
RHS
and P
RHL
an be derived that render
the Markov-hain model a good approximation of the evolution of the atual system.
The steady state distribution of the model is depited in Figure 2 for a ertain peer-
to-peer system with S
0
= 30, L
0
= 20, r = 0:5, q = 0:1 and rehabilitation probabilities
P
RHS
= 0:1 and P
RHL
= 0:0024. As already disussed, these values of P
RHS
and
P
RHL
result from the proper seletion of the punishment parameters of the redibility
mehanism aording to the proedure desribed in Setion 5. The z axis in Figure 2
is the equilibrium probability (s; l; k) that the system onsists of s sinere and l liar
peers not under punishment, while k = S
0
+ L
0
  s   l peers are under punishment.
Clearly, in the peer-to-peer system of Figure 2, sinere peers are almost never under
punishment during their lifetime, while liar peers are under punishment almost all of
their lifetime. Thus, the redibility mehanism is very eetive in expelling liar peers
from the peer-to-peer system if its punishment parameters are properly seleted.
Note that ollaborated liar peers should be fewer than sinere ones in the system in
order to dealt with eetively by the redibility mehanism. Otherwise, sinere peers
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Fig. 2 Equilibrium probabilities (s; l; k) for the punishment states of peers in a system with
S
0
= 30 sinere and L
0
= 20 liar peers when the redibility mehanism is employed.
would be involved into more disagreements than liar ones and onsequently they would
be under punishment most of their time; see equations (2) and (3). This is an inherent
limitation of the redibility mehanism. However, if liar peers are not ollaborated,
then a fration of liar peers higher than that of sinere ones an be tolerated.
5 The Proedure for Optimizing the Mehanism
As shown in Figure 2, the redibility mehanism is apable of providing the right inen-
tives to peers for truthful reporting of feedbak. However, this result applies for ertain
rehabilitation probabilities (essentially for ertain expeted punishment periods) that
are determined by the punishment parameters of the mehanism (i.e. the initial non-
redibility nr
0
, the base b of the exponential punishment, and the restoration fator
d). These parameters have to be properly seleted on the basis of the peer-to-peer sys-
tem's, i.e. peers' lifetime, servie availability, servie request probability et. in order
lying to be eetively punished without induing an unaeptable overhead for sin-
ere peers. In this setion, we propose a methodology for the alulation of the proper
parameters of the mehanism for any peer-to-peer environment. We speify two ideal
objetives on the ahievable eetiveness when employing the redibility mehanism in
a peer-to-peer system:
{ Objetive 1: Sinere peers must not be punished more than one during their life-
time.
{ Objetive 2: Liar peers must always be punished when they transat with other
peers.
Speially, onsider the Markov-hain model of peer-to-peer system desribed in
the previous setion. Reall that we have dened as the time step of our disrete time
Markov hain the time between any two suessive transations, i.e. the transation
unit. Furthermore, reall that, for the peer-to-peer system originally dened in Setion
3, we assume that time is slotted, while the population of the peer-to-peer system is
dynamially renewed, and S
0
, L
0
are kept onstant. Moreover, eah time slot equals
the minimum time interval between two suessive servie requests by the same peer.
Next, we explain how we an inter-relate the two aforementioned systems. We denote
as t
life
the mean lifetime of a peer in time slots. We also denote as t
s
(resp. t
l
) the
mean number of time slots that a sinere (resp. liar) peer is not under punishment
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during his lifetime, when our redibility mehanism is employed in the peer-to-peer
system. Thus, S
0
(t
s
=t
life
) [resp. L
0
(t
l
=t
life
)℄ is the mean number of sinere (resp. liar)
peers not under punishment at a ertain time slot. Realling that y given by equation
(1) is the probability to nd a requested servie, then the mean total number N
trans
of transations per time slot is given by the following equation:
N
trans
= y
t
s
S
0
+ t
l
L
0
t
life
(5)
Furthermore, we denote as n
s
and n
l
the mean numbers of transation periods
that a sinere and a liar peer respetively are not under punishment during their
lifetime that is denoted as n
life
in transation periods. Speially, n
s
= N
trans
 t
s
,
n
l
= N
trans
 t
l
and n
life
= t
life
 N
trans
. Reall now that aording to the Markov
model, the distribution of eah punishment period is geometri with expeted value
equal to 1=P
RHS
for sinere peers and 1=P
RHL
for liar peers. Using ergodi arguments,
Objetives 1 and 2 lead to the following equations
5
:
1
P
RHS
= n
life
  n
s
(6)
1
P
RHL
=
n
life
  n
l
yt
l
(7)
Indeed, Objetive 1 amounts to equation (6), whih implies that the expeted
punishment time for sinere peers equals the mean duration (in transation periods)
of the one and only punishment during their lifetime. Objetive 2 amounts to equation
(7), whih implies that the expeted punishment time for liar peers equals the mean
punishment time of a liar peer in transation periods divided by the mean number of
time slots where: (i) he is not under punishment, and (ii) he transats with another peer.
Speially in the denominator of equation (7), the term yt
l
expresses the number of
transations of a liar peer. Note that equations (6) and (7) express the most onservative
bounds arising from Objetives 1 and 2 for the mean punishment periods of a sinere
and a liar peer respetively. Equation (6) [resp. equation (7)℄ involves n
s
(resp. n
l
),
whih determines the mean fration of a sinere (resp. liar) peer's lifetime that he is
not under punishment, namely n
s
=n
life
(resp. n
l
=n
life
). In equations (6) and (7), the
values of these frations are treated as inputs. However, these values atually arise
as a result of the operation of the redibility mehanism. Thus, the input values in
equations (6) and (7) have to be onsistent with those resulting due to the mehanism.
Therefore, in order to determine the values of n
s
, n
l
that render the objetives feasible
a xed-point approah is followed:
1. Initially, we take that t
s
= maxft
life
 1; 1g, t
l
= maxf0:1t
life
, 1g and alulate the
orresponding n
s
, n
l
values. Note that, ideally, t
s
= t
life
  1 and t
l
= 0 should be
used aording to the Objetives 1 and 2; however, the hosen initial values for t
s
,
t
l
have been experimentally veried to speed up the onvergene of the xed-point
optimization approah.
5
Equation (6) is tighter than the orresponding one in [7℄, as it is now expressed in trans-
ation units instead of time slots. Also, equation (7) follows the Objetive 2 loser than the
orresponding one in [7℄, whih was unneessarily taking into aount the fration of sinere
peers in the system for feasibility reasons. However, feasibility is satised by our xed-point
optimization approah that determines the values of n
s
, n
l
.
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2. We alulate the mean fration of a peer's lifetime that he is not under punishment,
whih equals n
s
=n
life
for sinere and n
l
=n
life
for liar peers.
3. From equations (6) and (7) we alulate P
RHL
and P
RHS
. These are employed in
the Markov-hain model and the steady-state distribution of the punishment state
is alulated.
4. Then, the mean fration of a peer's lifetime that he is not under punishment is
re-alulated for sinere and liar peers based on the steady state probabilities, i.e.
n
0
s
=n
life
for sinere and n
0
l
=n
life
for liar peers.
5. If the onvergene riteria are met, e.g. jn
0
s
  n
s
j <  and jn
0
l
  n
l
j < , with
  0:03, then a xed point has been reahed, and the proper values of n
s
, n
l
have
been found for this peer-to-peer system. Otherwise, we set n
s
= (1 Æ)n
s
+Æn
0
s
and
n
l
= (1  Æ)n
l
+ Æn
0
l
, with Æ 2 (0:5; 1) as a relaxation parameter, and the ontrol is
transferred bak to step 2.
Having determined the values of n
s
and n
l
that give rise to Objetives 1 and
2, the proper parameters of the redibility mehanism have also to be derived. The
expeted value of total punishment period in time slots for a liar peer that is punished
in all of his transations is at most E[b
nr
0
(1 + b + b
2
+ :: + b
v
)℄, where v is the
number of transations. This is approximated as b
nr
0
(1 + b + b
2
+ :: + b
yt
l
), sine
E[v℄ = y  t
l
, whih is heneforth treated as integer for simpliity. The total punishment
period for a liar peer should be equal to the mean total punishment time for that peer
t
life
 t
l
, see equation (8) below. (Note that this is a bound beause the last punishment
period may not be fullled until the end of the lifetime of the peer. However, again we
take the equality, as it is the most onservative relation.) Similarly, the total expeted
punishment time of a sinere peer is taken as b
nr
0
 drh
, see equation (9). rh, given by
equation (10), is the expeted number of time slots where transations are onduted
by a sinere peer until his one and only punishment and d is the restoration fator;
thus rh  d is the expeted derease in the sinere peer's non-redibility value until
his punishment. Speially, in equation (10) the term
1
P
T
  1 expresses the expeted
number of transations of a sinere peer until punishment whih are translated to time
slots dividing by N
trans
. Note that the relations for b and nr
0
involve d as a parameter
as well. Instead of setting one more objetive and devise one more equation in order to
determine d, we take d = 0:5 for illustrative purposes. This is a meaningful hoie for
the restoration of a disagreement to require two agreements. Therefore, b, nr
0
(and
rh) an be determined by the equations below:
t
life
  t
l
= b
nr
0
b
yt
l
+1
  1
b  1
(8)
b
nr
0
 drh
= t
life
  t
s
(9)
rh =
y(
1
P
T
  1)
N
trans
(10)
6 Methodology for the Evaluation of the Optimized Mehanism
In this setion, we present the methodology for the assessment of the redibility meh-
anism that is followed in the subsequent setions: Initially, we desribe the simulation
model of the redibility mehanism in a peer-to-peer environment. Both in this model
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and in the Markovian model of Setion 4, the pairing of peers that transat is ran-
dom. Employing the simulation model, we prove the auray of the Markovian model
on the predition of the resulting punishment periods for sinere and liar peers in a
system where the redibility mehanism is employed. Moreover, we perform sensitivity
analysis of the redibility mehanism to the punishment parameters and prove that the
the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism is Pareto optimal for sinere peers for
the optimized punishment parameters. We also prove the appliability of the redibil-
ity mehanism with optimized punishment parameters for real peer-to-peer systems of
dierent harateristis. Then, we ombine the redibility mehanism with reputation-
based poliies, i.e. the pairing of peers that transat is done by means of reputation-
based poliies and we experimentally assess the eetiveness of the optimized redibility
mehanism in isolating liar peers that submit ratings' feedbak aording to various
xed strategies or a rational dynami strategy.
7 The Simulation Model
We onsider a peer-to-peer system where servies of a ertain kind are exhanged among
peers. Similarly, with other artiles [2℄, [11℄, [17℄, we assume that there are two types
of peers with dierent performane in this system: altruisti and egotisti. Eah peer
exhibits (either inherently or intentionally) a mixed strategy regarding his performane
in his servie provisions; this strategy depends on the peer's type. In partiular, eah
altruisti (resp. egotisti) peer provides a servie suessfully with a high probability
 = 0:9 (resp. with a low probability  = 0:1). Dierent servie provisions by the
same peer are taken as independent. At the same time, eah peer exhibits a reporting
strategy regarding the sinerity of his feedbak: he is either (always) sinere or liar.
The lying strategies onsidered are dened in Subsetion 9.1. In eah experiment, all
liars follow the same suh strategy. The performane and the reporting types of eah
peer are private information, i.e. only the peer himself knows them.
Furthermore, the population of peers is assumed to be renewed aording to a
Poisson proess with mean rate  = 10 peers/time slot, while the total size N of the
population is kept onstant, with N = 1500. That is, eah peer is assumed to live in the
peer-to-peer system for a period determined aording to the exponential distribution
with mean N=. When a peer leaves the system, a new entrant of the same type takes
his plae. To make matters worse, the vast majority of peers (90%) are taken to be
egotisti. The perentage of liar peers in eah experiment varies. In fat, for eah lying
strategy, we present the results for the maximum suh perentage that an be dealt
with eetively by our mehanism.
Time is assumed to be slotted. The duration of the time slot is of the same order
of magnitude as the average interval between two suessive servie requests by the
same peer. At eah slot, every peer requests a servie with a ertain probability r =
0:5. The relative large value of this parameter is not important for the eetiveness
of the mehanism and it just aelerates its onvergene. Servie availability is Zipf-
distributed, i.e. assuming that servies are ranked with respet to their popularity, a
servie with rank z is found at a ertain peer with probability z
 1
. For eah servie
instane, popularity is randomly seleted in the range [1; 300℄. A peer an serve only
one peer per slot due to his limited resoures.
The redibility mehanism of Setion 3 with optimized punishment parameters b,
nr
0
is employed in this system. Therefore, eah peer is assigned an optimized initial
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non-redibility value nr
0
. The non-redibility values are inreased upon disagreement
with his transated peer in their feedbak by 1 and dereased upon agreement by
d = 0:5. Upon disagreement, both peers i, j are exponentially punished for b
nr
i
,
b
nr
j
, where nr
i
, nr
j
are their non-redibility values prior to disagreement.
8 Assessment of the Optimization Proedure
8.1 Auray of the Markovian Model and Eetiveness of the Credibility Mehanism
with Optimized Punishment Parameters
First, we assess the auray of the optimization proedure of Setion 5 regarding the
expeted punishment periods resulting by the redibility mehanism with optimized
punishment parameters b and nr
0
for sinere and liar peers. Due to the ergodiity
arguments employed in the optimization proedure, it is expeted that if the Marko-
vian model is an aurate proxy of the employment of the mehanism in a peer-to-peer
system, then the mean punishment periods for sinere and liar peers resulting by sim-
ulation experiments for a long period are expeted to approximate the ones alulated
by equilibrium analysis of the Markovian model. Reall that the mean punishment
periods for sinere and liar peers depend on the b and nr
0
parameters aording to
the optimization proedure of Setion 5.
To this end, we denote as PM
S
, PM
L
the mean lifetime frations where sinere and
liar peers respetively are not under punishment, whih are alulated by the Markovian
model, and PS
S
, PS
L
the orresponding mean lifetime frations for sinere and liar
peers respetively that result after long simulation experiments. As depited in Table
2, the absolute dierenes jPS
S
 PM
S
j and jPS
L
 PM
L
j are very small (i.e.  0:02
and  0:06 respetively) for all dierent peer-to-peer systems onsidered. Thus, the
Markovian model indeed approximates very aurately the punishment eet of the
redibility mehanism for both sinere and liar peers in a multitude of peer-to-peer
systems of dierent harateristis.
Another result depited in Table 2 is that the redibility mehanism with the pun-
ishment parameters b and nr optimized for dierent peer-to-peer systems is very ee-
tive, as it always results to severe punishments for liar peers at equilibrium. Therefore,
a liar peer is almost always under punishment during his lifetime as PS
L
, PM
L
are
lose to 0, while sinere peers are almost never punished as PM
S
, PS
S
are lose to
1. Therefore, the optimization proedure of Setion 5 is very eetive. In Subsetion
8.3, we perform sensitivity analysis of the eetiveness of the mehanism to the sele-
tion of the punishment parameters and prove that the optimization proedure is also
neessary.
We now disuss how the optimized punishment parameters depend on the various
parameters of the peer-to-peer system. We found that b inreases and nr
0
dereases
the larger the system with the same other harateristis. This eet is the same with
inreasing the probability of requesting a servie per time slot and with inreasing the
probability of nding a requested servie at a peer, as they all result into an inreased
number of transations per time slot. When the number of transations per time slot
inrease, a larger number of punishments is expeted and then the mehanism onverges
faster. Therefore, for ahieving the objetives of Setion 5, nr
0
should be smaller, so
that the redibility mehanism results to a smaller unfairness for sinere peers; on the
ontrary, b should be larger, so that the resulting punishment for liar peers remains long
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Table 2 The auray of the Marovian model and the eetiveness of the redibility meh-
anism employed with punishment parameters b and nr
0
optimized for various peer-to-peer
systems.
lifetime q r S
0
L
0
b nr
0
PM
S
PS
S
PM
L
PS
L
150 0.1 0.5 22 18 1.57 6.19 0.966 0.947 0 0.038
150 0.1 0.5 40 10 1.44 8.07 0.97 0.982 0 0.03
150 0.1 0.5 35 15 1.44 8.02 0.95 0.963 0 0.03
150 0.06 0.5 37 30 1.82 4.15 0.968 0.954 0 0.036
150 0.1 0.5 30 10 1.87 3.85 0.997 0.982 0 0.03
150 0.1 0.3 30 10 1.25 14.41 0.99 0.966 0 0.044
150 0.025 0.5 30 10 1.24 15.05 0.995 0.965 0 0.056
400 0.1 0.5 30 10 1.36 5.16 0.995 0.981 0 0.028
800 0.1 0.5 30 10 1.22 15.47 0.995 0.991 0 0.016
enough. Also, as depited in Table 5, the same trend (although with small utuations)
is observed for punishment parameters when inreasing the perentage of liar peers in
a system while keeping the other harateristis onstant. Again, this is beause the
expeted number of punishments per time slot is larger in a system with more liars.
Finally, keeping the other system harateristis onstant and inreasing the average
lifetime of peers, the reverse trend for optimized punishment parameters is observed,
i.e. the base of punishment dereases and the initial exponent of punishment inreases.
This is beause the larger the lifetime of a peer, the larger should be the exponent of
punishment in order for liars to get punished for almost all their lifetime, while having
sinere being punished the minimum possible.
8.2 Appliability of the Optimized Mehanism
In this subsetion, we study the appliability of the optimization proedure for nding
punishment parameters b and nr
0
for arbitrary peer-to-peer systems and espeially
for those of large populations. This is very important as the Markovian model does not
sale well with the number of peers due to its large transition matrix, i.e. (S
0
+1)(L
0
+
1)(S
0
+1)(L
0
+1). We onsider a peer-to-peer system with xed rate of servie request
r = 0:5 and xed mean lifetime period of 150 time slots. The perentage of liars in the
systems is taken to be 45%. We alulate the optimized b and nr
0
parameters for a
xed population mix as population sales up. The probability q of nding a servie at
eah peer is taken to be 0.1 for a system of 40 peers. However, q is properly adjusted
for larger population sizes, so as the probability of nding the requested servie in the
system remains onstant as the system sales up and equal to 0.983. As depited in
Table 3, the periods t
s
, t
l
for sinere and liar peers respetively of not being under
punishment at equilibrium onverge to very lose values, whih even beome onstant
as the system sales up. This is very important, beause knowing t
s
, t
l
, one an estimate
the expeted number of sinere and liar peers at equibrium. Therefore, one an alulate
the probability y, given by equation (1), for a peer to ondut a transation at a time
slot and the probability P
T
, given by equation (4), to be punished at equilibrium for a
peer-to-peer system with arbitrary population and the same other harateristis. To
this end, for alulating the optimal parameters for a peer-to-peer system with large
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population, one should run the optimization proedure for a very small system of the
same other harateristis, namely population mix, average lifetime, and probability of
nding a requested servie in the system, and obtain t
s
and t
l
. Then, alulate y and P
T
for the larger system and alulate the optimal punishment parameters b, nr
0
using
equations (8), (9), (10). Using this methodology, we alulate the optimal punishment
parameters for larger peer-to-peer systems of 45% liars, with r=0.5, life=150 and
onstant probability of nding a servie in the system equal to 0.983 (see Table 4). As
shown in Table 4, the eetiveness of the optimized redibility mehanism is very high
and remains almost onstant for larger systems, i.e. sinere and liars are not under
punishment 95.5% and 4.5% of their lifetime.
Table 3 Optimized punishment parameters b and nr
0
for peer-to-peer systems with r = 0:5,
lifetime of 150 time slots and q = 0:1, L
0
=(S
0
+L
0
) = 0:45 but with dierent total population
sizes.
S
0
L
0
b nr
0
t
s
t
l
22 18 1.57 6.19 145.81 3.36
27 22 1.65 5.38 145.91 3.36
32 26 1.74 4.67 146.01 3.36
37 30 1.82 4.15 146.11 3.36
40 34 1.89 3.74 146.2 3.36
49 40 1.94 3.54 145.9 3.36
55 45 1.99 3.3 145.9 3.36
60 49 2.04 3.11 145.9 3.36
70 57 2.13 2.8 145.9 3.36
Table 4 Eetiveness of the optimized punishment parameters b and nr
0
as the peer-to-peer
system sales up.
S
0
+ L
0
b nr
0
PS
S
PS
L
500 2.6 1.73 0.956 0.044
1000 2.73 1.53 0.954 0.044
2000 2.80 1.43 0.955 0.044
3000 2.82 1.4 0.955 0.043
4000 2.83 1.39 0.954 0.043
5000 2.84 1.38 0.954 0.043
Another important issue for the appliability of the optimized redibility meha-
nism is the sensitivity of its eetiveness to the inauray of the harateristis of the
peer-to-peer system for whih the punishment parameters are optimized. Indeed, in
reality some dierenes between the estimated system harateristis and the real ones
are expeted. One ould rightfully argue that the population mix, i.e. estimating the
perentage of liars, might be hard to predit. Fortunately, as we observe in Table 5, t
s
and t
l
do not signiantly hange for dierent population mixes. Therefore, one an
selet t
s
and t
l
for a value lose to the estimated fration of liars in the optimization
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proedure without introduing signiant inauray to the optimization proedure.
Running the optimization algorithm for various dierent systems, we observed that
t
s
, t
l
at equilibrium mostly depend on the average lifetime of the peers in the sys-
tem and to a muh smaller extend to probability r of requesting a servie at a time
slot and the probability q of nding servies at a peer. We experimentally studied the
sensitivity of the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism to the inauray of the
estimated mean lifetime and the mean servie request ratio of the real peer-to-peer
system. We found that the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism remains roughly
the same for optimized punishment parameters alulated for a system with 10%
dierent mean lifetime, mean servie request rate and probability q. Therefore, the op-
timized punishment parameters are very eÆient despite small errors in the estimation
of the parameters of the peer-to-peer system for whih the redibility mehanism is
optimized. Also, note that these parameters of the peer-to-peer system are easier to be
aurately estimated, than the population mix.
Table 5 Optimized punishment parameters b and nr
0
for peer-to-peer systems with r = 0:5,
lifetime of 150 time slots and q = 0:1, S
0
+L
0
= 50 but with dierent frations of sinere and
liar peers.
S
0
=L
0
b nr
0
t
s
t
l
45/5 1.35 10.27 149.2 3.36
40/10 1.44 8.07 146.4 3.36
35/15 1.39 9.17 144 3.36
30/20 1.66 5.26 146.5 3.36
27/23 1.64 5.44 145.6 3.36
8.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Optimized Mehanism
We now investigate the sensitivity of the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism to
the punishment parameters seleted by the optimization proedure of Setion 5. To this
end, we onsider a peer-to-peer system with N = 1500 partiipants of whih 45% are
liars, with servie request rate per peer r = 0:5, with mean lifetime 150 time slots and
with probability of nding a requested servie in the system equal to 0.983. Employing
the Markovian model and the optimization proedure of Setion 5, we nd that the
optimized punishment parameters for this system are b = 2:77 and nr
0
= 1:46. Using
the simulation model of Setion 7, we run experiments for a long time and observe
the mean frations of time PS
S
and PS
L
that sinere and liar peers are not under
punishment. We modify b and nr
0
parameters by 50% and [-50%, 350%℄ respetively
from their optimized values and we run experiments again to observe resulting PS
S
and PS
L
. The resulting perentage dierenes in the eetiveness of the redibility
mehanism for sinere and liar peers are depited in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) respetively.
Note that the sensitivity of the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism to the pun-
ishment parameters b and nr
0
may be dierent for peer-to-peer systems of dierent
harateristis. As observed by Figure 3(a), the eetiveness of the optimized redibil-
ity mehanism is Pareto optimal for sinere peers, while it an be signiantly redued
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(i.e. up to 20% in this experiment) for dierent punishment parameters. The eetive-
ness of the redibility mehanism for liars is not Pareto optimal, but the mehanism
with optimized parameters ahieves that liars are under punishment 95% of their
lifetime. However, this result may signiantly deteriorate (i.e. over 50% in this exper-
iment) for punishment parameters other than optimized ones, as depited in Figure
3(b). Therefore, the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism is guaranteed to be high
only for the optimized punishment parameters.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 The perentage dierene of PS
S
(a) and PS
L
(b) that result by simulation exper-
iments when the redibility mehanism is employed with punishment parameters b and nr
0
that have a perentage dierene than their optimized values.
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9 Integration with Reputation-based Poliies
In this setion, we experimentally investigate the eetiveness of the redibility meh-
anism when ombined with reputation based poliies, suh as those that we desribed
in [2℄. This is very important onsidering that the introdution of reputation in every
peer-to-peer system aets the eligibility of peers to be seleted for transation by
other peers, as explained there. Furthermore, it was established in [2℄ that reputation
provides the right inentives for high performane only when proper reputation-based
poliies are employed in the peer-to-peer system.
In the experiments of this setion, we employ the simulation model of Setion 7
along with the Max-Max reputation-based poliy pair: eah lient selet to transat
with the provider that has the highest reputation among those that oer the requested
servie and providers selet to transat with the lient that has the highest reputation
among those that ompete for the same servie at the same time slot. We have also
run experiments where we employed other poliies of [2℄ and we notied similar eets.
Note that the Markovian model of Setion 4 is not adequate to measure the eetive-
ness of the redibility mehanism when ombined with reputation-based poliies, as the
random seletion of the transated parties is no longer valid: here peers are seleted to
transat based on their reputation values. If we assumed high inauray of reputation
in the peer-to-peer system, then peers ould be assumed to be seleted ad ho initially.
However, as reputation values beome more aurate due to the presene of the redi-
bility mehanism in the system, a yle of reputation information is formed: two peers
are seleted to transat based on their reputation values, both provide feedbak on the
provider's performane after transation, upon agreement the reputation of the pro-
viding peer is updated aeting its probability to be seleted in the future while upon
disagreement both transated peers are punished and then the transated peers are
again seleted based on their reputation and so forth. This reputation bias ould only
be desribed by a Markovian model that would have a muh larger number of states,
e.g. omprising all the disrete reputation levels that a peer ould be assumed to be
ategorized into. However, we would thus end up with a omputationally non-tratable
Markovian model. On the other hand, we determine the punishment parameters of
the redibility mehanism aording to the optimization proedure of Setion 5, so
as to optimize the eetiveness of the mehanism in the worst ase senario of high
inauray of reputation values in the system.
After a transation eah of the peers involved sends feedbak to the reputation
system as explained in Setion 3. Votes are onverted into reputation values using
the Beta aggregation rule disussed in Setion 3. The reputation value for a peer is
assoiated to his pseudonym, and expresses his probability of oering high performane
given his past reord. The peer-to-peer system is onsidered noiseless in the sense that
the outome of a transation depends only on the performane of the providing peer
in this transation. A peer is assigned a low initial reputation h
0
(i.e., h
0
= 0:1),
in order to limit the inentive for name hanges. In the experiments onduted, we
assess the eÆieny attained in this peer-to-peer system when the optimized redibility
mehanism is employed, whih is measured as the mean number of suessfully provided
servies to eah peer type. Partiular emphasis is plaed on the eÆieny of sinere
altruisti peers, as suh peers oer the most of the value of the peer-to-peer system.
We also assess the inentives oered per type of peers for truthful reporting. First, liar
peers are assumed to employ stati strategies, while next liar peers are assumed to be
rational employing a dynami strategy.
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9.1 Stati Lying Strategies
Reall that peers belong to two xed reporting types namely sineres and liars. Liars
may follow various strategies for manipulating their ratings depending on their obje-
tives. We onsidered four possible lying strategies, some of whih are similar with those
in other related works [4℄, [8℄, [18℄:
{ Destrutive, in whih liar peers reverse the feedbak on the outome of their trans-
ations.
{ Opportunisti, in whih liar peers laim that they always sueed in their transa-
tions and that all other peers not ollaborated with them fail.
{ Mixed, in whih a liar peer randomly selets whih of the above two lying strategies
to employ. The seletion probability may vary with time.
{ Disriminating, in whih a liar peer apart from being opportunisti, only serves
peers ollaborated with him, thus bypassing the Max-Max poliy.
Liar peers may be ollaborated to eah other in the sense that they always rate posi-
tively eah other.
In all the experiments of this subsetion, we assume that liars are ollaborated to
eah other. We also omit an initial \bootstrapping" period of operation of the peer-
to-peer system in the beginning of whih all peers are newomers. (This period lasts
for 250 slots; in general its duration depends on various parameters, but mainly on the
servie request probability.) Thus, we assess the eÆieny of peers during the normal
operation of the peer-to-peer system with dynamially renewed population. First, liar
peers are taken to follow the destrutive lying strategy and to onstitute the 45% of
the population of the peer-to-peer system. Using the optimization proedure of Setion
5, we nd that the optimized punishment parameters for this system are b=2.77 and
nr
0
=1.46. In Figure 4(a), depited are the mean reputation values of sinere peers,
whih are very aurate when the redibility mehanism is employed, as shown by
arrow 1 for altruisti and by arrow 2 for egotisti peers. Indeed, the mean reputation
values for sinere altruisti and egotisti peers are very lose to their orresponding
a priori probability for suessful servie provision  = 0:9 (resp.  = 0:1). On the
ontrary, if the redibility mehanism is not employed, then the two performane types
annot be distinguished by means of reputation. Also, note that altruisti liar peers
benet from the absene of the redibility mehanism as opposed to altruisti sinere
ones! Therefore, peers have wrong inentives in the absene of our mehanism. On the
other hand, the mean reputation values for liar peers are higher when the redibility
mehanism is employed, as depited in Figure 4(b). This is beause liar peers agree on
their feedbak only in their transations with liars and as a result due to the redibility
mehanism they reeive only positive ratings.
Next, we deal with eÆieny issues for the same set of experiments. The number of
total suessfully obtained servies per peer (i.e. eÆieny) inreases for both altruisti
and egotisti sinere peers when the redibility mehanism is employed, as depited
by arrow 1 in Figure 5(a) and 5(b) respetively. On the ontrary, when the redibility
mehanism is employed, the eÆieny of liar peers (whih was greater than that of
sinere ones) beomes almost zero as depited by arrow 2. Also, when the redibility
mehanism is employed, the eÆieny ahieved by sinere peers in the presene of
liars is very lose (i.e. up to 10% relative dierene) to that ahieved in the ideal
ase where no liar peers are present in the peer-to-peer system. The same onlusion
also applies for egotisti sinere peers, whose eÆieny is muh lower than that of
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Fig. 4 The mean reputation values of sinere (a) and liar (b) altruisti and egotisti peers
when the redibility mehanism is employed (\redibility") or not (\no redibility") in a peer-
to-peer system with 45% ollaborated liar peers that follow the destrutive strategy.
altruisti sinere ones, as expeted. That is, the redibility mehanism enables the
proper operation of the reputation for performane when reputation-based poliies
are employed. Thus, when our redibility mehanism is employed, the disturbane of
sinere peers by presene of liars is minimal. The introdution of the mehanism is very
beneial for sinere peers and very harmful for liar ones, who reeive a muh lower
eÆieny than sinere peers. Therefore, the strategy of ollaborative destrutive lying
strategy is dominated by the \always be sinere" strategy. Our mehanism renders
truthful reporting inentive-ompatible for peers, as liars spend most of their lifetimes
being under punishment. On the ontrary, sinere peers reover very soon both from the
initially high non-redibility value and from their possible unfair punishments imposed
by the redibility mehanism.
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Fig. 5 The umulative number of suessfully oered servies per altruisti (a) and per egotis-
ti (b) peer when the redibility mehanism is employed (\redibility") or not (\no redibility")
in a peer-to-peer system with 45% liar peer that follow the destrutive strategy.
Next, we onsider the ase where liar peers are ollaborated and follow the oppor-
tunisti lying strategy. In order for the optimized punishment parameters to properly
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alulated for this strategy, we replae the formulas of equations (2) and (3) of the
probabilities P
S
and P
L
that a sinere or a liar peer respetively is punished at eah
time slot by the following ones:
P
S
=
l
s+ l  1
y[l
a
(1  a) + l
e
(1  )℄
P
L
=
s
s+ l  1
y(1  l
a
)a+ (1  l
e
)) ;
(11)
where s, l are the expeted number of sinere and liar peers at equilibrium, estimated
in Setion 5, and l
a
, l
e
are the frations of altruisti and egotisti liar peers in the
system respetively. These formulas are derived by the denition of the opportunisti
lying strategy. Note that these hanges in the Markovian model do not hange the op-
timization proedure dened in Setion 5. Then, the alulated optimized punishment
parameters are b = 2:5 and nr
0
= 1:9. Indeed, nr
0
should be higher in order for
liar peers to be punished for long enough despite the fewer disagreements that they
are involved into. When the redibility mehanism with these punishment parameters
is employed in a peer-to-peer system with 40% ollaborated liar peers that follow the
opportunisti strategy, then the number of total suessfully oered servies per peer
(i.e. eÆieny) inreases for both altruisti and egotisti sinere peers, as depited by
arrow 1 in Figures 6(a) and 6(b) respetively. On the ontrary, the eÆieny of liar
peers (whih was greater than that of the ideal ase) beomes lower than that of the
sinere ones, as depited by arrow 2 in Figures 6(a) and 6(b).
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Fig. 6 The umulative number of suessfully oered servies per altruisti (a) and per egotis-
ti (b) peer when the redibility mehanism is employed (\redibility") or not (\no redibility")
in a peer-to-peer system with 40% liar peer that follow the opportunisti strategy.
Liar peers are next supposed to follow the disriminating strategy. In this ase,
the optimized punishment parameters for the redibility mehanism are alulated by
the optimization proedure of Setion 5, but using the formulas in equations (12) for
alulating the probability P
S
(resp. P
L
) that a sinere (resp. liar) peer is punished at
eah time slot. These probabilities are diretly derived by the denition of the disrim-
inating lying strategy desribed in the beginning of this subsetion. The punishment
parameters alulated by the optimization proedure of Setion 5 are b = 1:15 and
nr
0
= 23:2. The same argument for nr
0
in the ase of the opportunisti strategy also
applies for this lying strategy. However, b has to be low so as the unfair punishment for
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sinere peers to be minimized. We experimentally found that the optimized redibility
mehanism eetively deals with up to 12% of peers that follow this lying strategy, as
depited in Figures 7(a) and 7(b).
P
S
= 0
P
L
=
s
s+ l  1
y(
s
a
s
a+
s
e
s
)
(12)
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Fig. 7 The umulative number of suessfully oered servies per altruisti (a) and per egotis-
ti (b) peer when the redibility mehanism is employed (\redibility") or not (\no redibility")
in a peer-to-peer system with 12% liar peers that follow the disriminating strategy.
We also onsider the ase that liar peers follow the mixed strategy. Employing the
above methodology for optimizing the punishment parameters, we have experimentally
found that the numbers of suessfully oered servies to sinere altruisti and egotisti
peers respetively are always equal or greater than the orresponding ones oered to liar
altruisti and egotisti peers respetively, when the optimized redibility mehanism
is employed in a peer-to-peer system with up to 33% liar peers. Therefore, truthful
reporting dominates the mixed lying strategy under the redibility mehanism and
truthful reporting is inentive-ompatible for peers.
Finally, we have experimentally observed the eet of subjetivity to the ee-
tiveness of the redibility mehanism. We only desribe the interesting ase of severe
subjetivity, i.e. when the subjetivity is so high that reates feedbak disagreements
between sinere peers and thus they get unfairly punished. We found that the redibil-
ity mehanism is still eetive to isolate liars, as long as the sum of the total fration
of transations that are subjet to severe subjetivity and the fration of ollaborated
liars is lower than the orresponding upper bounds that are presented earlier in this
setion for eah lying strategy. However, the eÆieny of the peer-to-peer system for
sinere peers may be signiantly aeted. For example, if 2%, (resp. 5%) of the trans-
ations are subjet to severe subjetivity,  10% (resp.  20%) of the eÆieny for
sinere peers is lost.
Note that the above results were also experimentally veried for Uniform servie
distribution. Also, note that the eetiveness of the redibility mehanism inreases as
the renewal rate of the population of the peer-to-peer system dereases, as expeted.
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This is beause, a number of time slots is needed for the non-redibility and the reputa-
tion values of the peers to onverge to their proper values. Moreover, the eetiveness
of the mehanism inreases with the perentage of sinere peers. The upper bound on
the perentage of liar peers that follow the destrutive strategy and are not ollabo-
rated to eah other and they an eetively dealt with by the redibility mehanism
was experimentally found to be 55%. In partiular, we found that the eÆieny for sin-
ere peers is near that of the ideal ase, while the eÆieny of liar peers is diminished
when the redibility mehanism is employed. This was expeted, as in this ase liar
peers disagree even when they transat with eah other. Suh frations of liar peers
that are not ollaborated orrespond to liar peers that do not belong to the same real
entities. On the other hand, large frations of ollaborated liar peers orrespond to
artiially generated identities on behalf of a ertain real entity. Suh olletives of so
high frations of liar peers are diÆult to emerge in large atual peer-to-peer systems
where a proper membership mehanism that requires some real-life redentials for is
employed.
9.2 Rational Dynami Lying Strategy
So far, we have experimentally proved that the redibility mehanism, employed jointly
with reputation-based poliies, assigns very high eÆieny to sinere peers despite the
presene of high frations of liars that all follow one of the xed lying strategies of
Subsetion 9.1. Next, we assume that peers hoose their lying probability aording
to a dynami rational strategy so as to maximize their long term expeted payo
by means of a learning algorithm explained below. We employ the simulation model
dened in Setion 7. The lifetime of eah peer is exponentially distributed with mean
value 150 time slots. After this lifetime period, the peer rejoins the system under a
new pseudonym with lean transation reord and with the initial values of reputation
and redibility. In this setion, we assume that a peer belongs to the same authority
throughout its onseutive lifetime periods during the operation of the system. Thus, a
peer retains its probability to lie between two onseutive lifetime periods. This setting
orresponds to a peer that periodially hanges its pseudonym to lean its reord of low
performane and lying, but retains its probability to lie that has been learned in order to
maximize its expeted payo. Under this model, eah peer i follows a rational dynami
strategy aording to whih it selets its probability s
i
to lie in feedbak reporting
aording to a learning algorithm explained below. Upon lying, a peer follows the
destrutive lying strategy, while liar peers are supposed to be ollaborated. Aording
to the learning algorithm, after the expeted lifetime period of a peer, its payo (i.e.
the number of time slots that the peer was not under punishment) is ompared to the
payo of the peer at the end of its previous lifetime period and its probability s
i
to lie
is adjusted aordingly:
{ If the probability s
i
was previously inreased during the last lifetime period and
this was not beneial, then derease s
i
in the next period. Otherwise, further
inrease s
i
in the next period.
{ If the probability s
i
was previously dereased during the last lifetime period and
this was not beneial, then inrease s
i
in the next period. Otherwise, further
derease s
i
in the next period.
The above senario orresponds to a repeated game among peers that have two pure
strategies: Tell the truth and Lie. Eah peer tries to optimally hoose its mixed strategy
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by learning. Consider that the initial fration of peers that lie is very important for the
evolution of the system; the redibility mehanism by nature demands a lower fration
of ollaborated liar peers in the system than that of sinere ones in order to be eetive.
Therefore, we expet that the redibility mehanism provides the right inentives to
peers only when fewer than 50% of peers of the system initially lie. Indeed, as depited
in Figure 8(a), if only 45% of the population initially lie with probability 1, while the
other 55% of the population has zero lying probability (or equivalently if all peers have
an initial lying probability 45%), then the peer-to-peer system asymptotially evolves
to a stable equilibrium where all peers report their feedbak truthfully. Thus, the
redibility mehanism provides inentives to rational peers to be truthful. Otherwise,
if 55% of the population initially lie, then the peer-to-peer system evolves to a stable
equilibrium where all peers onstantly lie in their feedbak reports, as depited in
Figure 8(b).
Time
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Time
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Fig. 8 a) The evolution of the mean probability of peers to rate truthfully, when the redibility
mehanism is employed in a peer-to-peer system where initially 45% of peers lie. b) The
evolution of the mean probability of peers to rate truthfully, when the redibility mehanism
is employed in a peer-to-peer system where initially 55% of peers lie.
10 Implementation Issues
10.1 The Arhiteture
We have already demonstrated the eetiveness of our proposed mehanism for pro-
moting redible reporting of feedbak in a peer-to-peer system, as well as the right
inentives provided thereby. Next, we disuss how this mehanism an be implemented
in a ompletely inseure, anonymous and distributed peer-to-peer environment. The
redibility information for eah peer has to be eÆiently stored and traeable. Authen-
tiation, integrity and non-repudiation of the redibility information and the feedbak
messages are also required. The seurity issues an be dealt with by means of the
publi-key infrastruture (PKI). Upon registering in the peer-to-peer system, eah peer
hooses a publi-private key pair and reates his own ertiate, whih is signed by the
system; that is, it is signed by a ertain number of randomly seleted peers, similarly
to Pretty Good Privay (PGP) [28℄.
Throughout the paper we have assumed that no peers are pre-trusted. Thus, we
propose an implementation that does not rely on suh a requirement. Peers are assumed
27
Fig. 9 Determining disagreement in feedbak messages in a peer-to-peer environment.
to be organized in a hash-indexed struture enabling searh of data. Suh a struture
is already available in systems suh as Chord, P-Grid; see [4℄ and referenes therein.
Peers are required to submit their feedbak messages to other peers (referred to as
redibility holders) based on their node identier in the hash-indexed struture and
on a number of hash funtions employed for this purpose. Eah peer is responsible
for storing non-redibility values and punishment states of multiple other peers. Thus,
multiple peers are responsible for holding redibility information of eah xed peer.
After a transation, eah peer sends his feedbak message (provider identier, lient
identier, rating and performane metri) and its digest signed by his private key to
all peers that store redibility information of both transated peers, as depited in
Figure 9. Peers that reeive feedbak messages verify the sender and the integrity of
messages. Then, they detet agreement or disagreement of the feedbak messages and
ompute non-redibility values and update the punishment states of the transated
peers as neessary. If only one feedbak message is reeived, then this is also regarded
as a disagreement and both transated peers are punished. The redibility information
is vulnerable to strategi modiation by maliious peers. To avoid this, the redibility
information provided by the majority of holders an be taken as valid. If there is enough
redundany in storing redibility information, then any maliious modiation thereof
an be observed by the peer himself. Indeed, the peer an monitor the redibility
information about him periodially, by asking the orresponding information holders
and omparing their responses. Thus, if a peer detets signiant inonsisteny in
these responses, then the minority of holders should be punished for misreporting. The
redibility holders of the misreporting peers should be informed for this inonsisteny,
whih should be observable by these holders too. If there are fewer ollaborated liars in
the peer-to-peer system than sinere peers, then the inonsisteny will be revealed and
orreted, and the orresponding redibility information will be updated aordingly.
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Fig. 10 The average number of suessfully oered servies to (a) altruisti and (b) egotis-
ti peers when the redibility mehanism is employed or not in a system where peers store
redibility information and 25% ollaborative liars.
10.2 Collusive Liar Holders
In order to prove that our approah would still be eetive in ase that the holders
of redibility information were ollusive liars we have experimentally investigated suh
a senario. In this senario, holders of redibility information are normal peers, whih
have a xed reporting type being either sinere or liar as before. Holder peers store
and report redibility information (i.e. punishment state and non-redibility value) for
spei peers seleted by a hash funtion of the unique system identier of the latter
ones. The strategy that liar holders follow is ollaboratively opportunisti in the sense
that they always store and report negative redibility information for sinere peers and
positive redibility information for their ollusive partners. Speially, liar holders:
{ Always report agreement and disount non-redibility value for a liar peer that is
involved as a lient in a transation.
{ Always report agreement and reord a positive vote for a liar peer that is involved
as a provider in a transation.
{ Report disagreement and reord a new punishment for a subjet sinere peer that
sueeded in a servie provision.
{ Report agreement and reord a negative vote for a subjet sinere peer that failed
in a servie provision.
Prior to a potential transation between two peers, eah of them asks the redibility
holders of eah transated party for the punishment state of the latter. Aording to
the redibility mehanism, only if neither of them is under punishment, the transa-
tion should take plae. However, the sinerity of the redibility information reported
depends on the reporting type of the majority of the holders for eah transated party.
After a transation, the transated parties submit their feedbak to all the holder
peers of both transated parties. Credibility holders independently observe agreement
or disagreement and store redibility information aording to their reporting type.
The redibility information stored by the majority will be taken into aount in the
future transations of these peers.
There are two approahes regarding reporting minorities: i) ignore them, ii) punish
them. The punishment of the minority holder peers after obtaining redibility infor-
29
mation ould be employed by reporting a disagreement to the respetive holders of
redibility information of eah of them. We implement the aforementioned senario
with 10 redibility holders for eah peer and ignoring minorities in the simulation
model of Setion 7 with parameters N = 1500, =10 peers/time slot, r = 0:5 and
Uniform servie availability with q = 0:00275. The punishment parameters are taken
to be b=1.77 and nr
0
=1.46. Also, the Max-Max reputation based poliy is employed
in the system. However, for the larity of results, reputation information is assumed to
be aurately and entrally stored, as opposed to redibility information. The average
number of suessfully oered servies for altruisti (resp. egotisti) peers in the pres-
ene of 25% liar peers when the redibility mehanism is employed or not is depited
in Figures 10(a) and 10(b) respetively. Therefore, if the perentage of ollaborated
liar holders is less than or equal to 25%, then there is no point in punishing reporting
minorities, as in suh a ase, liar holders have a minor impat to the ahievable eÆ-
ieny of sinere peers. On the other hand, it has been observed in other experiments
that if more than 25% liar holders are present in the peer-to-peer system, then pun-
ishing minorities is both neessary and eetive for providing the right inentives to
holders. Note that the punishment state of redibility holders (i.e. seond-order redi-
bility information) ould also be employed for determining the redibility information
of peers. However, then, the number of required messages for aquiring the redibility
information of transating peers would be multiplied by the number of holders.
11 Conlusion
In this paper, we have dened, analyzed and optimized a redibility mehanism that
we rst presented in [6,7℄. This mehanism provides inentives for truthful reporting
of ratings' information in peer-to-peer systems by disovering and punishing liar peers.
Based on a Markov-hain model, we found that the mehanism leads the system in ben-
eial steady states where almost all liar peers are under punishment, while almost all
sinere ones are not. The punishment parameters of the mehanism were optimized for
peer-to-peer systems of arbitrary harateristis by a xed-point proedure. The opti-
mization proedure was proved to be Pareto optimal and neessary for the eetiveness
of the mehanism. Moreover, we experimentally proved that the optimized redibility
mehanism ombined with reputation-based poliies assigns to sinere peers almost
ideal benet from the peer-to-peer system and diminishes the benet of liar peers even
when very high frations of ollaborated liars follow various stati and dynami rational
strategies. Therefore, truthful reporting is individually rational and inentive ompati-
ble for peers under the optimized mehanism, whih is thus strategyproof. Furthermore,
the frations of ollaborated liars suessfully dealt with by the redibility mehanism
are the highest in the literature. Also, we have disussed the implementation of the
mehanism in a real peer-to-peer system without entral authorities for storing red-
ibility information, and experimentally proved that the mehanism ould eetively
deal with up to 25% ollaborated liars that follow opportunisti strategies. Overall, in
this paper, we provided a omplete solution against free-riding and low-performane in
peer-to-peer systems.
As already explained, the optimized redibility mehanism is very eetive in iso-
lating liar peers. In further experiments omitted for brevity reasons, we found that
dierent punishment approahes in ase of a feedbak disagreement do not improve
this eetiveness. In partiular, attempting to limit the unfairness introdued for sin-
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ere peers upon disagreement, an alternative approah ould be to probabilistially
punish the transated peers aording to their relative non-redibility values. Another
approah ould be, instead of probabilistially punish peers upon disagreement, to keep
a ounter of the potential punishment for eah peer and inrease it by the respetive
probability of punishment of eah peer upon disagreement. Then, when the ounter of
potential punishment reahes 1 for a partiular peer, then this peer is deterministially
punished and his ounter is set to 0. Both these alternative approahes fail to deal with
large frations of liar peers that were suessfully dealt with by the original mehanism.
We have also onsidered a potential improvement of the integration of the redibility
mehanism with the reputation-based poliies by weighting the importane of a vote
by the non-redibility value of the lient peer. Again, this approah was experimentally
found to have almost no improvement to the eÆieny of sinere peers.
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